An Application of Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel Principles to Successive Prison Disciplinary and Criminal Prosecutions by Colussi, Joseph S.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 55 | Issue 4 Article 4
Summer 1980
An Application of Double Jeopardy and Collateral
Estoppel Principles to Successive Prison
Disciplinary and Criminal Prosecutions
Joseph S. Colussi
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement
and Corrections Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Colussi, Joseph S. (1980) "An Application of Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel Principles to Successive Prison Disciplinary and
Criminal Prosecutions," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 55 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol55/iss4/4
Notes
An Application of Double Jeopardy and Collateral
Estoppel Principles to Successive Prison
Disciplinary and Criminal Prosecutions
When an imprisoned person is accused of engaging in conduct
which is a criminal offense under state or federal law, the law per-
mits both the criminal justice and the prison disciplinary systems
to prosecute and punish him for the same alleged criminal con-
duct.' Even where a court finds the imprisoned person innocent of
the criminal charge, prison disciplinary sanctions are seldom dis-
turbed.2 The thesis of this note is that an imprisoned person
should not be burdened with the prospect of multiple prosecutions
and punishments for the alleged criminal conduct.
To obviate the prospect of multiple prosecutions and punish-
ments, most imprisoned persons have asserted their fifth and four-
teenth amendment rights not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the
same offense.' Though the United States Supreme Court has never
' See, e.g., United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911
(1978); Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 893 (1950);
Pagliaro v. Cox, 143 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1944); State v. Kerns, 201 Neb. 617, 271 N.W.2d 48
(1978); State v. Williams, 57 Wash. 2d 231, 356 P.2d 99 (1960). But see, e.g., Barrows v.
Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974); In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296 N.E.2d 280
(1973).
1 See Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977); People ex rel Day v. Lewis, 376 Ill.
509, 34 N.E.2d 712 (1941); Ex parte Rody, 348 Mo. 1, 152 S.W.2d 657 (1941).
In Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977), the court found "no fundamental unfair-
ness in a procedure whereby a prisoner is punished administratively for the.same conduct
that resulted in an acquittal on criminal charges." Id. at 898. But cf. Barrows v. Hogan, 379
F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (prison discipline not permitted where imprisoned person
acquitted on criminal charge by jury).
California has recently enacted legislation which adopts the position pronounced by the
Barrows court:
No person confined in a state prison ... shall be subject to any institutional
disciplinary action subsequent to an acquittal in a court of law upon criminal
charges brought and tried for the act or omission which is the sole basis of the
institutional disciplinary action.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 2657 (West Supp. 1979).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911
(1978); Mullican v. United States, 252 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1958); Ray v. State, 577 S.W.2d 681
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Conley v. Dingess, - W. Va. -. , 250 S.E.2d 136 (1978). The
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addressed the question whether the double jeopardy clause pro-
tects an imprisoned person from prosecution and punishment for
the same alleged conduct by both systems,4 most state and lower
federal courts have held that it does not.5
Although a defense founded on traditional double jeopardy prin-
ciples has generally failed to protect the imprisoned person, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, as it inheres in the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause,6 can serve as an alternative defense.7 The
doctrine has been construed to preclude relitigation in a noncrimi-
nal proceeding of any issue actually determined in a prior criminal
proceeding;8 its application has been limited to cases in which the
rule on this issue originated in state court cases. Compare People v. Conson, 72 Cal. App.
509, 237 P. 799 (1925); State v. Mead, 130 Conn. 106, 32 A.2d 273 (1943); People ex rel. Day
v. Lewis, 376 Ill. 509, 34 N.E.2d 712 (1941); People v. Huntley, 112 Mich. 569, 71 N.W. 178
(1897); Ex parte Rody, 348 Mo. 1, 152 S.W.2d 657 (1941); State ex rel. Turner v. Gore, 180
Tenn. 333, 175 S.W.2d 317 (1943) with Pagliaro v. Cox, 143 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1944).
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. V. This guarantee against double jeopardy "is one of the oldest ideas found
in western civilization," Bartkus v. ilinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting),
and its history can be traced from Greek and Roman times to the common law of England
and into the jurisprudence of the United States. Id. at 151-55. See also Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-37 (1969).
The double jeopardy clause not only protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense, Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874), but also prohibits reprosecution
following an acquittal, United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), and following a convic-
tion, In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
Two policy considerations generally have been cited as the basis for the double jeopardy
provision. One focuses on the inherent injustice of punishing a person twice for the same
offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 728-29 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874). The other stresses the danger of permitting
the state to subject a person to repeated trials for a single offense. Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). See generally Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 266-67
(1965).
" See United States v. Cluck, 542 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976);
United States v. Stead, 528 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976);
United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841 (1971); Patter-
son v. United States, 183 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 893 (1950); Yager v.
Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1030 (1967); Escobar v.
Roberts, 29 N.Y.2d 594, 324 N.Y.S.2d 318, 272 N.E.2d 898 (1971) (mem.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972).
5 E.g., United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 534 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911
(1978); State v. Croney, 425 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1968); State v. Maddox, 190 Neb. 361, 208
N.W.2d 274 (1973); Conley v. Dingess, - W. Va. - , 250 S.E.2d 136 (1978). Contra,
Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974); In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296
N.E.2d 280 (1973).
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
See Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
See, e.g., People v. Robart, 29 Cal. App. 3d 891, 106 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1971) (collateral
estoppel precluded revocation of parole proceeding); People v. Grayson, 58 Ill. 2d 260, 319
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sanction imposed by the noncriminal tribunal is punitive in
nature.9
This note initially analyzes the traditional double jeopardy
precedents which distinguish the nature of the prison disciplinary
system from the criminal justice system. It then explores the appli-
cability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the prison discipli-
nary process, develops a "punitive sanctions" test for the prison
disciplinary process and proposes an expanded role for the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel in prison disciplinary dispositions. Fi-
nally, the note discusses several administrative alternatives for
resolving the multiple prosecution and punishment problem.
PRISON DISCIPLINARY PROCESS AND THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CLAUSE:
TRADITIONAL ANALYSES
In most cases where the imprisoned person has asserted a plea of
double jeopardy in order to obviate the prospect of both prison
disciplinary and criminal prosecutions and punishments, the plea
has eluded thoughtful judicial scrutiny. 10 The United States Su-
preme Court has declined on several occasions to pursue the prob-
lem,11 though it has been confronted by most state and lower fed-
eral courts. 12 Fashioned in an era when the judiciary refused to
N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 994 (1975) (collateral estoppel precluded revocation
of probation proceeding). But see, e.g., Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977)
(collateral estoppel did not preclude revocation of parole proceeding); State v. Jameson, 112
Ariz. 315, 541 P.2d 912 (1975) (collateral estoppel did not preclude revocation of probation
proceeding).
' See Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886); People v. Grayson, 58 I. 2d 260, 265,
319 N.E.2d 43, 45-46 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975); accord, United States v.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 (1971).
10 See United States v. Cluck, 542 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976)
(frivolous plea); United States v. Stead, 528 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
953 (1976) (prison disciplinary action does not reach the "dignity" of former jeopardy). See
generally State v. Williams, 208 Kan. 480, 493 P.2d 258 (1972); State v. Shoemaker, 273
N.C. 475, 160 S.E.2d 281 (1968) (no authority cited).
"i United States v. Cluck, 542 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976);
United States v. Stead, 528 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976);
United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841 (1971); Patter-
son v. United States, 183 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 893 (1950); Yager v.
Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1030 (1967); Escobar v.
Roberts, 29 N.Y.2d 594, 324 N.Y.S.2d 318, 272 N.E.2d 898 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972).
" See, e.g., the cases cited in State v. Kjeldahl, - Minn. - , 278 N.W.2d 58 (1979);
State v. Croney, 425 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1968); State v. Maddox, 190 Neb. 361, 208 N.W.2d 274
(1973).
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interfere with prison management,13 the early precedents manifest
indifference toward the constitutional rights of imprisoned per-
sons."' Despite judicial intervention in prison affairs in the past
13 See generally Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
Prior to the revolution in the field of criminal justice in the 1960's, courts took the posi-
tion that they were "without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with
ordinary prison rules or regulations." Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). Judicial deference to prison administration came to be known
as the "hands-off" doctrine. Note, supra, at 506 n.4.
No longer do courts strictly adhere to those early precedents which arbitrarily disregarded
the constitutional claims of imprisoned persons: "[A convicted felon] has, as a consequence
of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the
law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State." Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 19 Va. 1024, 1026, 21 Gratt. 790, 796 (1871). Although one commentator
believes that the federal courts safeguard constitutionally protected interests if the exigen-
cies of incarceration do not outweigh constitutional infringement, see J. PALMR, CONSTIU-
TIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 125 (1977), this has not been the case where imprisoned per-
sons are punished and prosecuted by the prison disciplinary and criminal justice systems for
the same criminal act. See note 17 & accompanying text infra.
Another recent commentary suggests that the traditional "hands-off" approach is reap-
pearing. Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reap-
praisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 220 (1977). Professor Calhoun argues that the Su-
preme Court does not analyze the merits of imprisoned persons' constitutional claims
consistently with its statement that imprisoned persons possess constitutional rights. Id. at
219-20. She concludes:
Through such deference, the Court has achieved a result that it could much
more easily and candidly have achieved had it simply declared that prisoners
are not entitled to constitutional protection. The Court . .. has permitted a
hardy weed, the "hands-off" approach, to creep back into the prison yard from
which it ostensibly had been banished.
Id. at 220.
14 In People ex rel. Day v. Lewis, 376 IMI. 509, 34 N.E.2d 712 (1941), the Illinois Supreme
Court decided that it could not interfere with the exercise of administrative disciplinary
policy by substituting its judgment for that of the prison administration. Id. at 517, 34
N.E.2d at 715. The court did not disturb the prison disciplinary sanction, id., which in-
cluded solitary confinement and forfeiture of all earned good-time credits, even though the
imprisoned person had been acquitted on a criminal charge based on the same facts and the
loss of good-time effectively lengthened the term of imprisonment by four years. Id. at 512,
34 N.E.2d at 713. See also People v. Conson, 72 Cal. App. 509, 237 P. 799 (1925); State v.
Mead, 130 Conn. 106, 32 A.2d 273 (1943); State v. Cahill, 196 Iowa 486, 194 N.W. 191
(1923); People v. Huntley, 112 Mich. 569, 71 N.W. 178 (1897); Ex parte Rody, 348 Mo. 1,
152 S.W.2d 657 (1941).
The failure of state courts to apply double jeopardy principles to the prison disciplinary
process may, in part, be explained by the fact that the fifth amendment double jeopardy
clause was not applicable to state criminal proceedings until 1969. See Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy clause held applicable to state criminal proceedings
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). However, prior to the Benton
decision, all states except Connecticut, Maryland; Massachusetts, North Carolina and Ver-
mont had double jeopardy provisions in their respective constitutions. J. SIGLER, supra note
3, at 78. The five states which did not, considered the protection from double jeopardy part
of their common law. See id. For a history of common law double jeopardy, see generally
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decade, 15 recent state and federal decisions disclose a judicial re-
luctance to reevaluate antiquated precedent.1 6
Courts frequently avoid the imprisoned person's double jeopardy
defense by assigning the fifth amendment phrases "jeopardy" and
"same offense" artificial meanings.1 7 They distinguish the nature of
the prison disciplinary proceeding from the criminal proceeding on
two grounds: (1) since the nature of the prison disciplinary process
is not "essentially criminal,"18 an imprisoned person is not placed
in constitutional jeopardy;19 and (2) since a violation of a prison
disciplinary offense is not a criminal offense, the imprisoned per-
son is not twice placed in jeopardy for the "same offense. '20
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-55 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Ex parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874); Note, supra note 3.
25 See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
16 See, e.g., United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911
(1978); Ray v. State, 577 S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Conley v. Dingess, - W.
Va. - , 250 S.E.2d 136 (1978); Hamby v. State, 559 P.2d 1388 (Wyo. 1977). The old cases
are unsatisfactorily reasoned, see notes 13-14 & accompanying text supra, while the recent
cases merely cite the old ones. See, e.g., United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543, 546 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978); Ray v. State, 577 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1979).
17 See People v. Bachman, 50 Mich. App. 682, 213 N.W.2d 800 (1973). See generally
United States v. Cluck, 542 F.2d 728, 735 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976)
(double jeopardy claim considered frivolous); United States v. Stead, 528 F.2d 257, 259 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976) (claim did not reach the "dignity" of former
jeopardy); State v. Kjeldahl, - Minn. _ -, 278 N.W.2d 58, 60 (1979) (a finding for
imprisoned persons would "trivialize" the double jeopardy clause).
Is State v. Procter, 51 Ohio App. 2d 151, 153, 367 N.E.2d 908, 911 (1977); accord, Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
'1 See, e.g., Yager v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1030 (1967); Nelson v. State, 567 P.2d 522, 524 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); accord, People
v. Bachman, 50 Mich. App. 682, 213 N.W.2d 800 (1973); Ex parte Kirk, 96 Okla. Crim. 272,
252 P.2d 1032 (1953). But see, e.g., In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296 N.E.2d 280 (1973).
20 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 1 Md. App. 297, 229 A.2d 723 (1967); People v. Wilson, 6
Mich. App. 474, 149 N.W.2d 468 (1967). But see, e.g., In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296
N.E.2d 280 (1973).
A third ground has occasionally been put forth: since infliction of a disciplinary sanction
- to be endured contemporaneously with a court imposed sentence - does not lengthen a
court imposed sentence, the prison disciplinary disposition is not a double punishment
within the meaning of the fifth amendment; the extra punishment merely makes the service
of the prison term more onerous. See Jenkins v. State, 367 So. 2d 587 (Ala. Crim. App.
1978); Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1971); People v. Ford, 175 Cal. App. 2d 37, 345
P.2d 354 (1959); People v. Lewis, 73 IlM. App. 3d 361, 386 N.E.2d 910 (1979); Lewis v. Smith,
38 App. Div. 2d 883, 329 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1972); State v. Williams, 57 Wash. 2d 231, 356 P.2d
99 (1960). However, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the loss
of good-time credits does effectively lengthen the term of imprisonment if the credits are
not subsequently restored. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974).
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The Concept of "Jeopardy" in the Prison Disciplinary Process
In its constitutional sense, "jeopardy" describes the risk that has
been traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.21 Though
the constitutional language, "jeopardy of life or limb, '22 suggests
proceedings which impose the most severe of sentences, it has al-
ways been construed to encompass those proceedings which can
culminate in extremely slight sanctions.23 As a defendant in a
prison disciplinary proceeding, however, an imprisoned person is
not placed in constitutional jeopardy.2 To be deemed subject to
21 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975) (extending the double jeopardy clause to juve-
nile delinquency proceedings).
The prospect of multiple prosecutions and punishments once plagued juvenile offenders.
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court made applicable to juvenile proceed-
ings certain constitutional rights traditionally associated with adult criminal prosecutions.
The Court discarded the notion that constitutional guaranties could be denied where proce-
dural distinctions existed:
We do not mean ...to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administra-
tive hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials
of due process and fair treatment.
Id. at 30.
Mr. Justice Blackmun stated in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971), that
"[llittle. . .is to be gained by any attempt simplistically to call the juvenile court proceed-
ing either 'civil' or 'criminal.' The Court carefully has avoided this wooden approach." Yet
prison disciplinary process is presently viewed by the courts in the same manner as the
juvenile delinquency process was a decade ago.
One imprisoned person has argued that he should be entitled to the same constitutional
rights that a juvenile offender is given in a delinquency proceeding, since the evolution of
the prison disciplinary process closely parallels that of the juvenile delinquency process. See
State v. Weekley, - S.D. - , 240 N.W.2d 80 (1976). The two proceedings have been
distinguished on the grounds that a prison disciplinary proceeding, unlike a juvenile delin-
quency proceeding, is not "essentially criminal" and that prison punishment is only meant
to serve the orderly administration of the penitentiary. Id. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 82. Al-
though many of the purposes of the two proceedings overlap and though the imprisoned
person suffers the same anxiety as the juvenile offender, the court in Weekley decided that
to treat jeopardy as attaching at a prison disciplinary proceeding would "trivalize" the pro-
tection provided by the double jeopardy clause. Id.
22 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2' See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874) (multiple punishment for the
same offense violates the double jeopardy prohibition).
The prevention of multiple punishment for the same offense was foremost in the minds of
the framers of the double jeopardy clause. James Madison's first double jeopardy proposal
read: "No person shall be subject ...to more than one punishment or one trial for the
same offence." 1 ANNALS OF CONoRESS 486 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789). Mr. Benson, of New
York, understood the provision as embodying the "humane intention... to prevent more
than one punishment." Id. at 753.
2' Despite the litany of similarities between the due process guaranties in a criminal and
prison disciplinary proceeding, see notes 26-35 & accompanying text infra, it may be in-
ferred from Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), that an imprisoned person is not
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constitutional jeopardy, an imprisoned person has been required to
demonstrate that he has endured a "trial before a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction under an indictment or information sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction. 2 5 A mere demonstra-
tion that he was tried before an administrative tribunal has not
sufficed.
This characterization of the nature of the prison disciplinary
process is supported by the Supreme Court's declaration in Wolff
v. McDonnell6 that "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part
of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a de-
fendant in such proceedings does not apply. '27 The Court ruled,
however, that before an imprisoned person could be seriously pe-
nalized for a disciplinary violation - the serious penalties in this
case being the loss of good-time credits and solitary confinement
- the state must provide certain minimal procedures.28
According to the due process criteria set forth in Wolff, an im-
prisoned person faced with disciplinary proceedings is entitled to
at least twenty-four-hour written notice of the charges 29 and has
the right "to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in
his defense when doing so [is] not ... unduly hazardous to insti-
tutional safety or correctional goals."30 The imprisoned person is
placed in constitutional jeopardy at a prison disciplinary proceeding. See also Yager v. Com-
monwealth, 407 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1030 (1967); Nelson v. State,
567 P.2d 522 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); accord, People v. Bachman, 50 Mich. App. 682, 213
N.W.2d 800 (1973); Ex parte Kirk, 96 Okla. Crim. 272, 252 P.2d 1032 (1953). But see In re
Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296 N.E.2d 280 (1973).
25 Nelson v. State, 567 P.2d 522, 524 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); accord, People v. Conson,
72 Cal. App. 509, 237 P. 799 (1925); People v. Wilson, 6 Mich. App. 474, 149 N.W.2d 468
(1967).
26 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
27 Id. at 556. The Supreme Court drew similar procedural distinctions in other criminal
proceedings. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (revocation of probation proceed-
ing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole proceeding). But cf.
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (juvenile delinquency proceeding sufficiently criminal).
The prison disciplinary process has been variously described as a disciplinary proceeding,
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), a civil proceeding, State v. Weekley, - S.D.
-, -, 240 N.W.2d 80, 81 (1976); Conley v. Dingess, - W. Va. -, -, 250 S.E.2d
136, 138 (1978), an administrative proceeding, State v. Boyd, 498 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Mo.
1973); State v. Mayes, 190 Neb. 837, 840, 212 N.W.2d 623, 624-25 (1973), an administrative
trial, Lewis v. Smith, 38 App. Div. 2d 883, 884, 329 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (1972), and a "kanga-
roo" court, Bronstein, Reform Without Change: The Future of Prisoners' Rights, 4 Civ. Lim.
REv. 27, 28 (Sept./Oct., 1977).
28 418 U.S. at 557-58.
29 Id. at 563-64.
30 Id. at 566.
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also entitled to an impartial hearing body 1 and to a written state-
ment which discloses the evidence relied on and the reasons for
any disciplinary action taken.3 2 The Court added that while it was
not required, it might be useful for the prison officials to state
their reasons for refusing to call a witness.33 Though an imprisoned
person has no absolute right to cross-examine witnesses at the dis-
ciplinary hearing, the majority ruled that correctional officials
could, in their discretion, permit cross-examination.34 Finally, the
majority held that the imprisoned person had no right to be repre-
sented by counsel.3 5
Though most jurisdictions now provide greater procedural safe-
guards than those constitutionally required by Wolff, 3 6 courts re-
main adamant in their unwillingness to eschew "civil" or "adminis-
trative" labels of convenience;37 they continue to distinguish the
nature of the prison disciplinary and criminal proceedings through
procedural comparisons. Since they have failed to respond to the
invitation of the Supreme Court to reassess continually the prison
31 Id. at 570-71.
32 Id. at 564.
33 Id. at 566.
" Id. at 568. Justice Douglas, dissenting, expressed the views that the threat of any sub-
stantial deprivation of liberty within the prison is a loss which can be imposed only after a
full hearing with all due process safeguards and that imprisoned persons could not be de-
prived of their constitutional right to confront and cross-examine their accusers. Id. at 595
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See also id. at 580 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., concurring and dis-
senting in part).
31 Id. at 570. But see id. at 595 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36 See generally ABA RESOURCE CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW, SURVEY OF PRISON DIsci-
PLINARY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA SURVEY]; see
also Bureau of Prisons Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units, 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.10-
.22 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Federal Disciplinary Policy]; NEW YORK DEP'T OF STATE,
OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS, tit. 7 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES §§
253.1-.6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NEW YORK DISCIPLINARY POLICY]; ILLINOIS DEP'T OF
CORRECTIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS No. 804, ADMINISTRATION OF DISCIPLINE (1979)
[hereinafter cited as ILLINOIS DISCIPLINARY POLICY]; INDIANA DEP'T OF CORRECtIONS, ADULT
AUTHORITY DISCIPLINARY POLICY (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as INDIANA DISCIPLINARY
POLICY].
For model correctional standards, see AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MODEL COR-
RECTIONAL RULES AND REGULATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ACA MODEL DISCIPLINARY
POLICY]; IJA-ABA JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, CORRECTIONS ADMIN-
ISTRATION (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA MODEL JUVENILE DISCIPLINARY POLICY]; ABA
Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, The Legal Status of Prisoners, 14 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 375 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA Model Adult Disciplinary Policy].
37 See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 73 Ill. App. 3d 361, 386 N.E.2d 910 (1979); State v. Kerns, 201
Neb. 617, 271 N.W.2d 48 (1978); State v. Procter, 51 Ohio App. 2d 151, 367 N.E.2d 908
(1977); Ray v. State, 577 S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). But see, e.g., Barrows v.
Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974); In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296 N.E.2d 280
(1973). See also note 27 & accompanying text supra.
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disciplinary process,38 it seems that where prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings lack some of the procedural elements of a criminal pro-
ceeding an imprisoned person who is subject to prison disciplinary
action is not placed in constitutional jeopardy.
The Concept of "Same Offense" in the Prison Disciplinary
Process
Not only must an imprisoned person demonstrate that constitu-
tional jeopardy has attached at a prison disciplinary proceeding, he
also must be deemed to have been twice placed in constitutional
jeopardy for the same offense.3 9 Since the fifth amendment phrase
"same offense" is narrowly construed by most courts,' 0 an impris-
oned person's plea of double jeopardy has provided inadequate
protection.
In Blockburger v. United States,1 the Supreme Court adopted
the "same evidence" test to define the phrase "same offense." Ac-
cording to the Court, "[t]he applicable rule is that where the same
" The Court said that their conclusions in Wolff were "not graven in stone. As the nature
of the prison disciplinary process changes in future years, circumstances may exist which
will require further consideration and reflection of this Court." 418 U.S. at 572. One com-
mentator has interpreted the Supreme Court's intention in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308 (1976), to restrict severely the ability of the judiciary to take part in the reshaping of
the dispositional process. See J. PALw.R, supra note 13, at 113. According to Professor
Palmer, Wolff established the maximum, rather than the bare minimum, constitutional re-
quirements. Id. If Professor Palmer is correct, then the obligation is clearly on legislatures
and correctional agencies to expand the procedural safeguards of the prison disciplinary
process. See notes 112-16 & accompanying text infra.
" See, e.g., Smith v. State, 1 Md. App. 297, 229 A.2d 723 (1967); People v. Wilson, 6
Mich. App. 474, 149 N.W.2d 468 (1967); accord, People v. Bachman, 50 Mich. App. 682, 213
N.W.2d 800 (1973); cf. In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296 N.E.2d 280 (1973) (a prison
disciplinary sanction subsequent to a criminal conviction punished an imprisoned person
twice for the same offense).
,0 See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1923) (the "same evidence" test
used to define the fifth amendment phrase "same offense").
After Blockburger, the Supreme Court applied the "same evidence" definition of "same
offense" in cases involving multiple counts in one trial. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 388 (1958). There was uncertainty, however, as to whether the Court adopted the
"same evidence" test in cases involving multiple prosecutions, rather than multiple counts,
for the same offense. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198 n.2 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). A minority of the Court often advocated a broader definition of "same offense"
because the "same evidence" definition would seldom prevent multiple prosecutions. See
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 451-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall &
Douglas, JJ.). Justice Brennan maintained that the double jeopardy clause :'requires the
prosecution in one proceeding ... to join ... all the charges against a defendant that grow
out of a single criminal act or occurrence." Id. at 453-54.
41 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof
of a fact which the other does not. '42 The test thus focuses on the
statutory elements of each offense. If one offense specifies elements
which the other does not,43 multiple prosecutions and punishments
are not prohibited despite the substantial overlap of proof offered
to sustain a conviction on each offense. Under the Blockburger
test, an overzealous prosecutor can obtain multiple convictions for
the same offense by assiduously using his thesaurus and statute
book and continually redefining the crime, each time requiring
slightly different criminal elements.44 In the case of sequential
criminal prosecutions, the Blockburger test undermines the major
policy basis of the double jeopardy clause.
" Id. at 304. The "same evidence" test was first announced in The King v. Vandercomb,
168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (1796): "[U]nless the first indictment were such as the prisoner
might have been convicted upon it by proof of facts in the second indictment, an acquittal
on the first can be no bar to the second." See also J. SIGLER, supra note 3, at 63-69; Conley,
Former Jeopardy, 35 YALE L.J. 674 (1926); Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double
Jeopardy, 58 YAE L.J. 513 (1949); Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy, and Res Judi-
cata, 39 IowA L. Rav. 317 (1954); Note, Double Jeopardy: Multiple Prosecutions Arising
from the Same Transactions, 15 AM. CraM. L. REv. 259 (1975); Note, Ashe v. Swenson:
Collateral Estoppel, Double Jeopardy, and Inconsistent Verdicts, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 321
(1971); Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause: Refining the Constitutional Proscription
Against Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 804 (1972).
'3 See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Blockburger, the defen-
dant had been indicted and tried on five separate counts under the Harrison Narcotics Act.
The third count charged the sale of a drug not in or from the original stamped package. Id.
at 301. This same sale was charged in the fifth count as not having been made pursuant to a
written order of the purchaser. Id. The Court held that this single sale constituted two
offenses because it violated two sections of the Act and each provision required proof of a
fact which the other did not. Id. at 304.
In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), however, the Court held that a greater and lesser
included offense are the same offense for purposes of the double jeopardy protection against
multiple trials. Cf. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977) (defendant loses his double
jeopardy protection against multiple prosecutions for greater and lesser included offenses
when: (1) the events necessary to the greater crime have not taken place at the time the
prosecution for the lesser offense is begun; (2) the fa-As necessary to the greater crime were
not discoverable, despite the exercise of due diligence, before the first trial; and (3) the
defendant asks for separate trials on the greater and lesser included offenses, or fails to raise
the issue that one offense might be the lesser included offense of the other).
" Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970).
The general policy behind the double jeopardy clause was summarized by the Supreme
Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957):
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-Ameri-
can system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecu-
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In the case of sequential prison disciplinary and criminal pro-
ceedings, the Blockburger construction of "same offense" has re-
ceived an even more formalistic application.46 Courts have gener-
ally held that an imprisoned person is not twice placed in
constitutional jeopardy for the same offense, since the alleged
criminal conduct violates a prison regulation and a criminal stat-
ute. As stated by one court, there is no "identity of offenses" be-
tween a prison disciplinary regulation and a criminal statute.7
This distorted construction of the "identity of offenses" theory
fails to take into account that a prison disciplinary regulation
which prohibits criminal conduct is typically defined in terms of
the respective criminal statute.48 Though the tribunals differ in
each adjudication, neither the prison nor the criminal offense re-
quires proof of a fact which the other does not.4'
The elements of the prison and the criminal offense are identi-
cal.5 0 In one state, an imprisoned person who violates the "general
laws of the State or Federal government" also commits a prison
disciplinary offense.51 The prison disciplinary offense is necessarily
defined in the same terms as the criminal statute which is violated.
rity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty.
4" See, e.g., Smith v. State, 1 Md. App. 297, 229 A.2d 723 (1967); People v. Wilson, 6
Mich. App. 474, 149 N.W.2d 468 (1967); accord, People v. Bachman, 50 Mich. App. 682, 213
N.W.2d 800 (1973); State v. Collins, 115 N.H. 499, 345 A.2d 162 (1975).
4 People v. Bachman, 50 Mich. App. 682, 683, 213 N.W.2d 800, 801 (1973); accord, Peo-
ple v. Wilson, 6 Mich. App. 474, 475, 149 N.W.2d 468, 469 (1967).
43 See note 51 & accompanying text infra.
" See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 367 So. 2d 587 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (prison and criminal
actions based on the same facts); Carruth v. Ault, 231 Ga. 547, 203 S.E.2d 158 (1974) (crime
and act for which administrative punishment was assesed were one and the same); Washing-
ton v. Rodriguez, 82 N.M. 428, 483 P.2d 309 (1971) (criminal action based on the same act
which was the basis of the prison disciplinary proceeding).
" See note 51 & accompanying text infra.
5, ILLmOIS DISCILIAsRY POLICY, supra note 36, at 1-3. In Indiana, disciplinary action
might be brought against an imprisoned person who is charged by the prison administration
with homicide, assault, battery, escape, extortion, blackmail, theft, arson, indecent exposure,
counterfeiting and gambling. INDIANA DISCIPLINRY POLICY, supra note 36, at 32-36. Though
the Federal Bureau of Prisons does institute disciplinary action for alleged criminal conduct,
see, e.g., United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911
(1978); United States v. Salazar, 505 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Herrera, 504
F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Acosta, 495 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Apker, 419 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1969); Gibson v. United States, 161 F.2d 973 (6th
Cir. 1947), the institutional investigating officer must suspend investigation of the crime and
may not question the imprisoned person until the Federal Bureau of Investigation has com-
pleted its investigation, Federal Disciplinary Policy, supra note 36, § 541.12. Once the FBI
has completed its investigation, the imprisoned person may be brought before the prison
disciplinary board. Id.
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The prison disciplinary board cannot find an imprisoned person
guilty of the prison disciplinary offense unless it is satisfied that
the prison administration has proved every element of the of-
fense.52 A state or federal prosecutor is also required to prove the
same elements in a criminal action. In both the prison disciplinary
and the criminal proceedings, the same evidence may be heard on
the same elements.53 Most courts have failed to appreciate the new
dimension which the prison disciplinary offense adds to the con-
struction of "same offense." A more fitting response would be a
reasoned application of the Blockburger test, which pairs the
prison disciplinary and criminal offenses against their elements;
this would necesarily bar multiple prosecutions and punishments
for the same offense."
"' In most prison disciplinary proceedings, the prison administration must demonstrate
an imprisoned person's guilt by a preponderance of the evidence or by substantial evidence.
See, e.g., Federal Disciplinary Policy, supra note 36, § 541.15(f) (greater weight of the evi-
dence and supported by substantial evidence manifested in the record of the proceedings);
NEw YORK DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36, § 253.4 (substantial evidence on the record
as a whole); ILLINOIS DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36, at 1 (reasonable satisfaction that
offense committed); INDIANA DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36, at 23 (substantial
evidence).
The ABA MODEL JuvENILE DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36, § 8.9(E), requires the
prison administration to demonstrate the guilt of the imprisoned juvenile by clear and con-
vincing evidence. However, the ABA Model Adult Disciplinary Policy, supra note 36, §
3.2(e)(vi), only requires the prison administration to demonstrate guilt by a preponderance
of the evidence. Unlike the juvenile disciplinary process, the adult disciplinary process does
not permit the prison administration to bring disciplinary action where there has been an
alleged criminal violation. Id. § 3.3(a).
See Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (jury heard the same evidence
as the disciplinary board). See generally Jenkins v. State, 367 So. 2d 587 (Ala. App. 1978);
Carruth v. Ault, 231 Ga. 547, 203 S.E.2d 158 (1974); Washington v. Rodriguez, 82 N.M. 428,
483 P.2d 309 (1971).
Neither the prison nor the criminal offense requires proof of a fact which the other does
not. See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); cf. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161 (1977) (one convicted of a greater offense may not be subjected to a subsequent criminal
prosecution for a lesser included offense); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977)
(greater and lesser included offenses are the "same offense" for purposes of the double jeop-
ardy defense). The prison disciplinary offense is not a lesser or greater included offense of
the criminal statute. The elements of each offense are identical. See note 51 & accompany-
ing text supra.
" Although a reasoned application of the Blockburger test would bar multiple prosecu-
tions and punishments, an artful prosecutor could institute criminal action against the im-
prisoned person by carefully redefining the criminal charge. The prosecutor would be free to
charge a new offense in the criminal action so long as the prison offense were not a lesser or
greater included offense. For this reason, the fifth amendment phrase "same offense" should
be defined in terms of complusory joinder, which would require the state to join all charges
against an imprisoned person that grow out of a single criminal transaction, for the purpose
of preventing multiple prosecution. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN THE PRISON DISCIPLINARY PROCESS:
A PUNITIVE SANCTIONS TEST
Although traditional double jeopardy theories have failed to in-
sulate imprisoned persons from multiple prosecutions and punish-
ments, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as it inheres in the
double jeopardy clause, "' is an alternative remedy. Collateral es-
toppel is derived from the broader common law principle of res
judicata.57 According to the doctrine, questions of fact and law ac-
In cases where the imprisoned person commits a single criminal act which has several
victims, the courts may use the Blockburger test to allow a separate prosecution for each
victim. Cf. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (defendant accused of murdering wife and
three children was tried separately for three of the murders); Moton v. Swenson, 488 F.2d
1060 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 957 (1974) (defendant accused of robbing two
men in one gas station robbery was tried separately for the robbery of each man); State v.
Smith, 491 S.W.2d 257 (Mo.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1031 (1973) (defendant accused of rap-
ing two women, murdering the two women and a man, and robbing the house, all in one
episode, was tried separately for two of the murders). Because the Blockburger test is satis-
fied if each charge requires proof of a fact which the other does not, the test will always
sanction a criminal action if there are multiple victims; the identity of the victim is an
additional question of fact. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 78 Wash. 2d 894, 480 P.2d 484, rev'd
on other grounds, 404 U.S. 55 (1971). Even a substantial overlap in the evidence in the two
proceedings is immaterial. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
Where there is only one victim, an imprisoned person may, by one act, violate many dif-
ferent criminal statutes or sections of criminal statutes. Under the Blockburger test there
can be a separate proceeding for each violation, since each will require prooftof a fact which
the other does not. See United States v. Hairrell, 521 F.2d 1264, 1266 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 1035 (1975); cf. United States v. Wilder, 463 F.2d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(prosecution for possessing an unregistered firearm did not bar prosecution for carrying a
concealed weapon without a license); Percy v. South Dakota, 443 F.2d 1232, 1235 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971) (prosecution for kidnapping did not bar a prosecution for
indecent molestation); State v. Miller, 5 Or. App. 501, 507, 484 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1971) (pros-
ecution for being an ex-convict in possession of a firearm did not bar prosecution for carry-
ing a concealed weapon). But cf. State v. Ahuna, 52 Haw. 321, 326, 474 P.2d 704, 707 (1970)
(prosecution for burglary and possession of an unregistered firearm barred prosecution for
possession of a firearm by an ex-felon because statutes are directed at people, not for who
they are, but for what they do).
" See note 57 & accompanying text infra.
"Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
"' The distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel is set forth by the Supreme
Court in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876) as follows:
[T]here is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel
against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand,
and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a
different claim or cause of action. In the former case, the judgment, if rendered
upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a
finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those
in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and re-
ceived to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose....
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tually litigated are conclusive in subsequent actions in which the
same questions arise, even though the cause of action might be dif-
ferent. The defense of double jeopardy requires identity of of-
fenses, but the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not. The de-
fense of double jeopardy, if successful, operates as a complete bar
to another prosecution, while the defense of collateral estoppel
might merely preclude the relitigation of certain issues.
In Ashe v. Swenson,5 s the Supreme Court held that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel preludes relitigation of an issue actually de-
termined in a criminal action.59 The Court applied the doctrine in
order to bar a second criminal action based on the same statutory
offense.60 In the wake of the Ashe decision, other courts have
designed a broadened theory of collateral estoppel which precludes
relitigation in a noncriminal proceeding of any issue actually deter-
mined in a prior criminal action.61 These decisions, which have ef-
fectively expanded the scope of the double jeopardy defense, com-
port with the principles of judicial finality and fundamental
fairness.
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different
claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only
as to th~se matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of
which the finding or verdict was rendered.
" 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
" Id. Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that collateral estoppel precluded the
second prosecution, but felt that double jeopardy barred reprosecution irrespective of
whether collateral estoppel was applicable. Id. at 448-49 (Brennan, J., concurring).
0 Id. at 446. Ashe raises several questions, not the least of which is why collateral estop-
pel should be preferred to a more comprehensive doctrine of double jeopardy. Justice Bren-
nan recognized that a broader definition of "same offense" would have precluded the second
prosecution in Ashe. Id. at 449-50 (Brennan, J., concurring). If applied to the prison disci-
plinary process, it would preclude multiple prosecutions for the same offense. See notes 48-
54 & accompanying text supra. Collateral estoppel was adopted in Ashe to compensate for
the deficiencies of the double jeopardy protection. It represents a compromise between those
members of the Court who would condemn multiple prosecutions and those who apparently
prefer to live with the archaic rules of double jeopardy. See generally Note, The Double
Jeopardy Clause: Refining the Constitutional Proscription Against Successive Criminal
Prosecutions, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 804, 825-26 (1972).
6 See People v. Grayson, 58 Dl 2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994
(1975); People v. Robart, 29 Cal. App. 3d 891, 106 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1973). See also Barrows v.
Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974). For a legislative enactment which bars a prison
disciplinary proceeding that follows an acquittal in a court of law on criminal charges, see
CAL. PENAL CODE § 2657 (West Supp. 1979).
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Issues Determined in a Criminal Action Should Not Be
Relitigated in a Prison Disciplinary Action
In People v. Grayson,2 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that
relitigation in a probation revocation proceeding of any issue actu-
ally determined in a prior criminal action was precluded by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.63 The case represents a revitaliza-
tion of an early United States Supreme Court doctrine which
favored finality of criminal judgments over technical distinctions
which might be drawn from the difference in the burdens of proof
imposed on the state in the two proceedings. 64 In Grayson, the Illi-
nois court reasoned that the doctrine of collateral estoppel "means
simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future law suit."6 5 The
42 58 MI1. 2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
Id. at 265, 319 N.E.2d at 45. In Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974), a
prison disciplinary case, the federal court took a similar position. Unlike the Illinois Su-
preme Court's reasoning in Grayson, the federal district court did not develop a "punitive
sanctions" test for the prison disciplinary process. The Barrows court was concerned prima-
rily with the finality of the criminal judgment and secondarily with the need to treat the
imprisoned person fairly. Id. at 316. But see Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977)
(no fundamental unfairness found).
58 Ill. 2d at 265, 319 N.E.2d at 45-46. The court cited United States v. United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971), as an example of the Supreme Court's most recent
amplification of this position. 58 IMI. 2d at 265, 319 N.E.2d at 46.
Proceedings for the forfeiture of property which was allegedly the subject matter of a
criminal transaction giving rise to a right of forfeiture have been barred against a claimant
who showed that he was acquitted of the same criminal acts relied on to justify the forfei-
ture. See Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886); accord, Lowther v. United States, 480
F.2d 1031, 1034 (10th Cir. 1973) (recognizing the vitality of Coffey). But cf. Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a noncriminal
action by the state, remedial in nature, arising out of the same facts on which the criminal
proceedings were based).
According to the Supreme Court, where the objective of the subsequent noncriminal ac-
tion is punitive, the acquittal on the criminal charge bars the noncriminal proceeding, be-
cause to entertain the second proceeding in order to punish the defendant is double jeop-
ardy: "double jeopardy is precluded by the Fifth Amendment whether the verdict was an
acquittal or conviction." Id. at 398 (tax penalties considered remedial sanctions).
Prior to Grayson, the rule developed by Coffey and cases following it did not clearly artic-
ulate whether the rule was founded on principles of criminal res judicata, double jeopardy or
both. The Grayson theory applies to both. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, as applied by
the Ilinois court, is part of the double jeopardy protection and also is part of the broader
doctrine of criminal res judicata. The broader doctrine of criminal res judicata has been
given effect in multiple criminal actions. See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923) (argu-
endo); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916) (constitutional guaranties against
double jeopardy do not have the effect of abrogating or supplanting in criminal cases the
principles of res judicata).
Is 58 Ill. 2d at 263, 319 N.E.2d at 45 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).
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court acknowledged that though the differences between a criminal
trial and a probation revocation proceeding are substantial, the
differences could not fairly serve to permit relitigation of identical
issues on the same evidence."" Thus, the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel applies so as to preclude relitigation in a noncriminal pro-
ceeding of any issue determined in a criminal action despite the
difference in the burdens of proof imposed on the state in the two
proceedings.
The critical question in determining whether a noncriminal pro-
ceeding, such as a prison disciplinary proceeding, can be equated
with a criminal proceeding for purposes of collateral estoppel anal-
ysis is whether the noncriminal proceeding can culminate in puni-
tive sanctions. The Supreme Court has ruled that an acquittal on a
criminal charge does not bar a noncriminal action arising out of
the same facts on which the criminal action was based, where the
sanction of the noncriminal proceeding is "remedial."6 If the na-
ture of the noncriminal sanction is punitive, however, an acquittal
on a criminal charge precludes relitigation of the same issues in a
subsequent criminal action based on the same facts."' By applying
this reasoning to the facts in Grayson, the Illinois Supreme Court
was convinced that revocation of probation is sufficiently punitive
in nature.89 If the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to be applied to
the prison disciplinary process, the fundamental questions are
whether the prison disciplinary process is sufficiently similar to the
revocation process and whether the prison disciplinary sanction is
punitive.70
The prison disciplinary process is nearly indistinguishable from
the parole and probation revocation processes.7 1 In Morrissey v.
Id. at 264-65, 319 N.E.2d at 45-46.
07 See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
See, e.g., Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886); accord, Lowther v. United
States, 480 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 n.5 (10th Cir. 1973) (any departure from Coffey must come
from the Supreme Court) (quoting United States v. One 1956 Ford Fairlane Tudor Sedan,
272 F.2d 704, 705 (10th Cir. 1959)). If a proceeding, noncriminal in form, is regarded as one
for the punishment of the alleged offender, it would appear that the prohibition against
double jeopardy would apply to bar punishment following a criminal conviction. See Helver-
ing v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398 (1938) (arguendo). However, the Coffey Court expressly
reserved any decision on the issue. 116 U.S. at 443-44. Other cases have given a conviction
the effect of a bar to the noncriminal proceeding. See In re Food Conservation Act, 254 F.
893 (N.D.N.Y. 1918); United States v. One Distillery, 43 F. 846 (D. Cal. 1890).
69 58 Ml. 2d at 265, 319 N.E.2d at 45; see note 64 & accompanying text supra.
70 Cf. Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (collateral estoppel given effect
to bar prison disciplinary proceeding without considering whether the discipline constituted
a punitive sanction).
71 See notes 74-76 & accompanying text infra.
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Brewer72 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli,'7 the Supreme Court ruled that
a probationer and a parolee respectively must be provided certain
minimal procedural safeguards in a revocation proceeding."
Though the Court made it clear that a defendant in a revocation
proceeding need not be accorded the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in a criminal prosecution, it did not clearly articulate
the ways in which revocation proceedings differ from criminal tri-
als.7 ' The requisite procedural safeguards in the revocation pro-
When a defendant is placed on probation, a sentence is pronounced but then suspended,
and the defendant is released. If the court later finds the conditions of his release violated,
the original sentence is then executed, or, in some jurisdictions, a new sentence is pro-
nounced. Compare Smith v. State, 261 Ind. 510, 307 N.E.2d 281 (1974) (increased sentence
may be imposed on revocation) with Hord v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1970)
(unconstitutional to increase sentence upon revocation).
A defendant is placed on parole only after he has served part of his sentence. Parole is
administered by a parole board, an administrative body, and not by a court. For a more
complete discussion of the differences between probation and parole revocation proceedings,
see generally Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State Revocation Proceedings, 42
U. CoLO. L. REV. 197, 225-28 (1970); Van Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearing in California:
The Right to Counsel, 59 CAL. L. REv. 1215, 1239-43 (1971).
72 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole).
73 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (revocation of probation).
7' See id. at 781-82; 408 U.S. at 484. The defendant must be provided some preliminary
proceeding to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe
that a violation of a condition on which his liberty rests has occurred. 411 U.S. at 781-82;
408 U.S. at 485. Only after the existence of reasonable grounds is demonstrated can a sec-
ond hearing be held. The second hearing determines: (1) whether the individual has violated
the terms of the conditional liberty agreement; and (2) whether the violation was serious
enough to warrant termination of the conditional liberty. 411 U.S. at 782, 784; 408 U.S. at
485, 487-88.
Certain minimum procedural protections must be provided at the second hearing. (1)
written notice of the claimed violation of parole or probation; (2) disclosure to the parolee or
probationer of evidence against him; (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not permitting confron-
tation and cross-examination; (5) a neutral and detached hearing body;, and (6) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for parole or pro-
bation. 411 U.S. at 786; 408 U.S. at 488-89.
75 See 411 U.S. at 781; 408 U.S. at 480. The opportunity to cross-examine may be denied
for good cause, id.; the right to counsel is not guaranteed, 411 U.S. at 790; and the state
need not demonstrate a parolee's or probationer's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See
United States v. Chambers, 429 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Lauchi, 427 F.2d
258 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 868 (1970); Amaya v. Beto, 424 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.
1970); United States v. Markovich, 348 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1965).
Formulations of the burden vary among states. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 105 Ill. App. 2d
14, 245 N.E.2d 13 (1969) (preponderance of the evidence); State v. Bettencourt, 112 R.I
706, 315 A.2d 53 (1974) (reasonably satisfactory evidence). In Colorado, when the act consti-
tuting a violation of conditional liberty is a crime, the state must prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. COLO. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-206(3) (1978).
" See 411 U.S. at 789. The Court has treated parole and probation revocation proceed-
ings similarly. In Gagnon, the Court noted that the two proceedings are constitutionally
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ceedings are nearly identical to the ones required by Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell77 in the prison disciplinary proceeding. Since the prison
disciplinary proceeding is nearly indistinguishable from the proba-
tion and parole revocation processes, the Grayson construction of
collateral estoppel is wholly applicable to the prison disciplinary
disposition. However, mere procedural similarities are not entirely
determinative of whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should
apply; it is the nature of the civil or administrative sanction which
is most significant.
Several jurisdictions have declined to view the revocation pro-
cess as the Illinois Supreme Court did in Grayson, on the ground
that the revocation of probation or parole is a "remedial" sanc-
tion.718 The majority of jurisdictions, however, consider the loss of
good-time credits or solitary confinement as entirely "punitive. 1 9
Unlike revocation cases, where a probationer or parolee has al-
ready enjoyed some of the rewards of his good conduct, in prison
disciplinary cases, the imprisoned person forfeits earned good-time
credits that have not been redeemed. As the split in authority indi-
cates,80 revocation of probation or parole is arguably "remedial."
This cannot be said of prison discipline; its function is to punish
criminal and noncriminal violations of prison disciplinary
regulations.81
indistinguishable. Id. at 782 n.3.
- 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Compare notes 27-35 & accompanying text supra with notes 74-76
& accompanying text supra.
78 See Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977); State v. Jameson, 112 Ariz. 315,
541 P.2d 912 (1975); Russ v. State, 313 So. 2d 758 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975);
Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 242 S.E.2d 53, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978).
In Standlee, the federal court acknowledged that an acquittal on a criminal charge will
bar a noncriminal action where the noncriminal action could culminate in a punitive sanc-
tion. 557 F.2d at 1306. The court did not, however, consider the revocation of parole to be a
punitive sanction. Id. at 1306-07.
79 See, e.g., Fitchette v. Collins, 402 F. Supp. 147, 152-53 (D. Md. 1975) (loss of good-time
is a punishment judicial in nature, since its imposition requires a particular imprisoned per-
son to serve a longer term in confinement); Commonwealth v. Sneed, 3 Mass. App. 33, 322
N.E.2d 435 (1975) (forfeiture of good-time is penal in nature); cf. State v. Kern, 447 S.W.2d
571 (Mo. 1969) (170 days of solitary confinement imposed as discipline).
'* Compare note 61 & accompanying text supra with note 78 & accompanying text supra.
81 See, e.g., United States v. Hedges, 458 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1972); People v. Elliot, 221
Cal. App. 2d 575, 34 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1963).
In most jurisdictions, the prison disciplinary board may impose a broad range of sanc-
tions. The disciplinary sanctions are intended as punishment. ABA SURVEY, supra note 36,
at 2. An imprisoned person may be punished by solitary confinement, loss of privileges, loss
of earned good-time credits and transfer to another institution. See Federal Disciplinary
Policy, supra note 36, § 541.11(d); N.w YORK DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36, § 253.5;
ILLINOIS DISCPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36, at 1-3; INDIANA DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra
[Vol. 55:667
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In its concern for fundamental fairness and for the interests an
imprisoned person has in his earned good-time credits, one court
has ruled that relitigation in a prison disciplinary proceeding of
any issue actually determined in a criminal action was precluded
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.82 In Barrows v. Hogan,"8 a
habeas corpus case, an imprisoned person was acquitted by a jury
which had heard all of the evidence on a charge of assault.8 Fol-
lowing the criminal action, the prison administration charged Bar-
rows with assault, a prison disciplinary violation, and the prison
disciplinary board, which heard the same evidence as the jury,
found him guilty and revoked his earned good-time credits.8 5 The
prison administration argued that an acquittal on a criminal
charge did not preclude punitive sanctions in a proceeding which
was governed by a lesser standard of proof.88 The federal district
court, unpersuaded, ordered that the good-time credits be restored
on the ground that a finding by a jury was a final determination
against the government on the question of whether Barrows com-
mitted the alleged crime.8 7 The court stated that "it is impermissi-
ble for the prison administration to determine otherwise and pun-
ish the prisoner for an offense as to which he had been ac-
quitted."88
Since the Barrows decision, one state has enacted legislation
note 36, at 16-20.
The ABA Model Adult Disciplinary Policy, supra note 36, § 3.2(c), does away with soli-
tary confinement as a permissible disciplinary sanction. The ACA MoDEL DISCIPLINARY POL-
icy, supra note 36, § I(B)(1), at 7, limits the maximum number of days of solitary confine-
ment to 15.
42 Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
3 Id.
" Id. at 316. See also note 52 & accompanying text supra.
" 379 F. Supp. at 315.
" Id. at 316. But see Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977). In Rusher, the prison
administration was not collaterally estopped from denying an imprisoned person his earned
good-time, even though he was subsequently acquitted on a criminal charge based on the
same facts. Id. at 899. However, Barrows is distinguishable, since the disciplinary proceed-
ing followed the criminal action. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
" 379 F. Supp. at 316. The common law doctrine of collateral estoppel is designed to
prevent the relitigation by the same parties of the same claims or issues. The traditional
policy, as adhered to by the courts, makes issues actually determined binding so as to fore-
close further inquiry. The policy is followed no matter how clear the mistake of fact, how
obvious the misunderstanding of law, how unfortunate the choice of policy, how unjust the
practical consequences or how inadequate the evidence in the record. The interest of the
parties and of the public in ending litigation normally precludes a party who has had an
adequate opportunity to present his case from further pressing the same claims or issues.
See generally lB J. MooRs, FwED AL PRACTICE 1 0.441 (1974 & Supp. 1979).
"4379 F. Supp. at 316.
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which prevents an imprisoned person from being "subject to any
institutional [prison] disciplinary action subsequent to an acquittal
in a court of law. . . . ,,8 Barrows and the parallel state statutory
safeguard provide only meager protection, however, for the scope
of their collateral estoppel effect is restricted to prison disciplinary
proceedings that are commenced after a criminal proceeding at
which the imprisoned person was acquitted. The great majority of
cases reported involve a criminal proceeding that is brought after a
prison disciplinary proceeding. In order to provide effective protec-
tion against multiple prosecutions and punishments, the doctrine
of collateral estoppel must be broadened to preclude relitigation in
a criminal action of any issue actually determined by the prison
disciplinary board.
Issues Determined in a Prison Disciplinary Proceeding
Should Not Be Relitigated in a Criminal Action
There is a developing body of case law which has applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to administrative adjudications to
preclude relitigation in a civil action of any issues actually deter-
mined by an administrative adjudicatory body.90 In United States
v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 1 the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that a board of contract's valid determination of an
issue for breach of contract is binding in a subsequent civil suit for
breach of contract involving the same facts and the same parties.92
The Court stated that its holding was harmonious with general
principles of collateral estoppel where the administrative adjudica-
tion has met three criteria. The decision expressly requires that
before the doctrine can be invoked the administrative body must
be acting in a judicial capacity,98 it must resolve disputed issues of
89 CAL. PENAL CODE § 2657(a) (West Supp. 1979).
The contours of the law of administrative res judicata were first proposed by Professor
Davis in 1958. See 2 K. DAvis, ADmmNSTRATvE LAW TREATISE § 18.12 (1958). The Supreme
Court adopted his position in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S.
394, 422 (1966), by stating: "When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity
and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an ade-
quate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce
repose."
See generally Mogel, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Administrative Proceed-
ings, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 463 (1978); Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Administrative
Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 65 (1977).
9- 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
92 Id. at 418-19.
,3 Id. at 422.
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fact which are properly before it,9 and the parties must have had
an adequate opportunity to litigate the facts.95 Other courts have
added a fourth criterion which requires that a finding by the ad-
ministrative tribunal on a material issue be supported by substan-
tial evidence on the record as a whole.96
If, as one might infer from Wolff v. McDonnell," a disciplinary
proceeding is not the equivalent of a criminal trial, then it must be
viewed as an administrative adjudication. The prison disciplinary
board acts in a "judicial capacity"; it abides by the essential ele-
ments of an adjudicatory hearing, including notice, cross-examina-
94 Id.
" Id. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1062 (1978); Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th
Cir. 1969); Seatrain Lines v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 207 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1953).
The Third Circuit's decision in Seatrain also stands for the proposition that res judicata
is applicable in administrative proceedings:
Normally, if such an issue [the jurisdiction of the tribunal] ... has once been
decided between the parties by a competent court, another court will not per-
mit the matter to be relitigated between the same parties in another case ....
The present case does present the additional consideration that the first deci-
sion was by... an administrative tribunal, rather than a court. But in the
circumstances that should make no difference.
207 F.2d at 259 (citations omitted). A similar position was taken by the Third Circuit in its
recent decision in Gulf Oil. The court refused to overturn the Federal Power Commission's
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel; rather it considered the doctrine's applica-
tion to be harmless error. 563 F.2d at 603. In Edgewood Contracting, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's conclusion that a National Labor Relations Board's determination
that a union was guilty of a secondary boycott was res judicata as to the question of liabiity
in a subsequent damage action brought against the union; it concluded:
The policy considerations which underlie res judicata - finality to litigation,
prevention of needless litigation, avoidance of unnecessary burdens of time and
expense - are as relevant to the administrative process as to the judicial ...
Nor is there any difference in the underlying principles because the adminis-
trative decision is sought to be given effect in a judicial proceeding.
416 F.2d at 1084 (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., Paramount Transport Sys. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 150,
436 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971); Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co.,
416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1969).
Six federal cases have been cited for the proposition that neither res judicata nor collat-
eral estoppel are applicable to the administrative process. See Bridges v. United States, 346
U.S. 209 (1953); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Pearson v. Williams, 202
U.S. 281 (1906); Jason v. Summerfield, 214 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840
(1954); Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 202 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd on other
grounds, 347 U.S. 239 (1954); Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
None of these cases, however, individually or collectively, stand for the foregoing principle;
instead, they generally turn on one or both of the following factors: (1) an administrative
proceeding which lacked the essential elements of an adjudicatory proceeding, see Garner v.
Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1978), or (2) the absence of technical elements, such as
lack of identity of parties and issues, see 2 K. DAvIS, supra note 90, § 18.02.
7 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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tion and confrontation, presence of counsel or counsel-substitute
and full opportunity to present evidence.9 8 The prison administra-
tion has both personal jurisdiction over the imprisoned person and
subject matter jurisdiction to institute charges against the impris-
owed person for alleged violations of prison disciplinary
regulations.99
Like other administrative adjudicatory bodies, the prison disci-
plinary board resolves "disputed issues of fact" which come before
it.10° Both parties have a full and fair opportunity to argue their
version of the facts. The board makes a factual determination that
there has been a violation of a prison disciplinary regulation and a
dispositional decision to punish the imprisoned person for the
breach of prison discipline.101 On a finding of guilt, the board may
sanction the imprisoned person by revoking all or part of his
earned good-time credits, by placing him in solitary confinement,
by transferring him to another institution or by denying him cus-
tomary privileges.1 0 2 The board also must prepare a written state-
ment that discloses the evidence relied on and the reasons for any
disciplinary action taken. 0 8
While the Supreme Court has never determined which standard
of proof is applicable in a prison disciplinary adjudication, correc-
tional departments generally require that an imprisoned person's
guilt be demonstrated at least by the substantial weight of the evi-
dence.' 0 ' Despite the difference in the burdens of proof imposed on
the state in the criminal and prison disciplinary proceeding, the
Wolff Court designed a system of procedural safeguards that were
meant to insure that the prison administration and the imprisoned
person have an adequate opportunity to litigate the facts. 105 The
minimal difference in the burden of proof cannot fairly serve to
permit the relitigation of identical issues on the same evidence.
" See notes 27-35 & accompanying text supra.
"See, e.g., Federal Disciplinary Policy, supra note 36, § 541.10; NEw YORK DISCnLINARY
POLICY, supra note 36, § 253.1; ILLINOIS DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36, at 1; INDIANA
DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36, at 1.
100 384 U.S. at 422; see notes 27-35 & accompanying text supra.
101 418 U.S. at 563-68.
102 See note 81 & accompanying text supra.
103 418 U.S. at 564.
104 See note 105 & accompanying text infra.
100 See note 52 & accompanying text supra. One model disciplinary process requires the
state to demonstrate an imprisoned person's guilt by a preponderance of the evidence, ABA
Model Adult Disciplinary Policy, supra note 36, § 3.2(e)(vi), while another requires that
guilt be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. ABA MODEL JuvENILE DISCIPLINARY
POLICY, supra note 36, § 8.9(E).
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Since the prison disciplinary proceeding clearly qualifies as an
administrative adjudication within the meaning of Utah Construc-
tion, an issue actually determined by the prison disciplinary board
should not be relitigated by the same parties in a subsequent civil
action. Moreover, since the sanctions imposed by the prison disci-
plinary board are punitive in nature, the state should not only be
precluded from relitigating the same issues in a subsequent civil
action, it also should be precluded from relitigating the same issues
in a subsequent criminal action. Where the nature of the adminis-
trative sanction is punitive, considerations of "repose" or judicial
finality, avoidance of duplicative proceedings, and fundamental
fairness1 08 outweigh the logical evidentiary discrepancies arising
from the different burdens of proof imposed on the state in the
two proceedings.10 7
ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS: A HUMANE AND RESOURCEFUL
ALTERNATIVE
The Role of Prison Administrators
Despite an underlying theory of the double jeopardy defense
that "it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a second time found
I"4 See Mogel, supra note 90, at 466. See also note 87 & accompanying text supra.
According to Professor Davis, any particular decision must be held either binding or not
binding. 2 K. DAvis, supra note 90, § 18.03. The choice is not between taking all or none of
the traditional doctrine, for the doctrine may be relaxed or qualified in any desired degree
without destroying its essential service. Id. The doctrine is also at its best as applied to
issues of fact. Id. The party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden of demonstrating
that the issues are identical and that they were determined on the merits in the first pro-
ceeding. This would not present an imprisoned person with any difficulty, since the ele-
ments of the prison disciplinary and criminal offense and the evidence offered in support of
those elements are the same in both proceedings. See notes 48-54 & accompanying text
supra.
For purposes of collateral estoppel, one governmental agency may be deemed in privity
with another governmental agency, since the state is the prosecuting party in both proceed-
ings. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
Where the issues in separate suits are the same, the fact that the parties are
not precisely identical is not necessarily fatal .... There is privity between
officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party
and a representative of the United States is res judicata in relitigation of the
same issue between that party and another officer of the government.
Id. at 402-03.
10 Contra, Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977) (acquittal was not conclusive of
the factual dispute before the prison disciplinary board on the same issue, since the prison
administration could demonstrate guilt by a lesser standard than reasonable doubt).
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guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow,"10 8 in prac-
tice, courts exempt the prison disciplinary process from the fifth
amendment double jeopardy protection.109 In order to bring the
prison disciplinary process within the protection of the double
jeopardy clause, it would be necessary for courts continually to
broaden the doctrine of collateral estoppel or to reassess prece-
dents that have given the constitutional phrases "jeopardy" and
"same offense" artificial meanings.
There is a simpler solution. The problem of multiple prosecu-
tions and punishments could be resolved by the correctional agen-
cies. Where an imprisoned person has allegedly engaged in crimi-
nal conduct, the prison administration should forego prison
disciplinary action. Where the alleged breach of prison discipline
does not involve criminal conduct, as was the case in Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell,1 the procedures required by Wolff are arguably suffi-
cient to strike a proper balance between correctional needs and
objectives and the imprisoned person's constitutional rights. Under
these circumstances the imprisoned person faces the prospect of
only one adjudicatory proceeding and one punishment.111 The due
process safeguards mandated by Wolff are insufficient, however, to
serve as adequate protection of an imprisoned person who faces a
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874).
109 See notes 10-54 & accompanying text supra.
120 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616 (D. Neb. 1972), modi-
fied, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the conduct which gave rise to the forfeitures of good-time credits
consisted of the following: swearing at a guard, possessing a sandwich in an unauthorized
place, being intoxicated, organizing a protest against the warden, loitering, staging a sit-
down strike in order to protest institutional policies, and refusing to obey orders to work, to
wear socks, to shave or to get a conforming haircut. 342 F. Supp. at 626-27.
The Supreme Court's position in Wolff cannot be read as an approbation of the view that
minimum procedural safeguards provided an imprisoned person in a prison disciplinary pro-
ceeding are sufficient where the alleged prison offense is also a criminal offense. Wolff
merely establishes the appropriate procedures that the prison administration must adhere
to before it can deny an imprisoned person his earned good-time or place him in solitary
confinement for a breach of prison discipline.
" Most prison administrations mete out punishment on two levels. One level deals only
with minor breaches of prison discipline. The other level deals with major breaches. A crimi-
nal violation is adjudicated at the second level. The severity of the punishment is limited by
the level at which the imprisoned person is tried. See generally Federal Disciplinary Policy,
supra note 36; ILLINOIS DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36; INDIANA DISCIPLINARY POLICY,
supra note 36; NEw YORK DISCIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36.
The ABA Model Adult Disciplinary Policy, supra note 36, § 3.3, also provides for a two
tier system. However, the ABA model does not permit a disciplinary hearing where the al-
leged conduct involves a possible criminal offense. Id. But cf. ACA MODEL DISCIPLINARY
POLICY, supra note 36, § IV(B), at 9 (permitting a disciplinary proceeding for alleged crimi-
nal conduct).
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prison disciplinary board on a criminal charge.
Where the alleged breach of prison discipline involves a possible
criminal offense, the role of the prison disciplinary process changes
significantly. Under these circumstances, the sole question put to
the prison disciplinary board is whether the individual committed
the elements of a crime. The resolution of that question, the raison
d'etre of the criminal justice system, should not be undertaken by
the prison disciplinary system.1 2
Several committees concerned with correctional reform have
drafted model standards which adopt this recommendation.11 The
model disciplinary standards propose that a prison disciplinary
proceeding be barred if the state decides to prosecute. 4 However,
a sampling of the revised disciplinary procedures of several depart-
ments of corrections indicates that prison administrators remain
unwilling to relinquish their power to punish the imprisoned per-
son for criminal conduct irrespective of whether a criminal charge
has been brought.1 5
*" If the imprisoned person is charged criminally and if institutional order or security
dictates, the imprisoned person may be confined in more secure housing during the pen-
dency of the criminal action. According to the ABA Model Adult Disciplinary Policy, supra
note 36, § 3.3(b):
If required by institutional order and security, the prisoner to be charged crim-
inally may be confined in his assigned quarters or in a more secure housing
unit for no more than 90 days, unless during that time an indictment or infor-
mation is brought against him. If a charge is made he may be so confined dur-
ing the pendency of the criminal prosecution.
"Is See ABA Model Adult Disciplinary Policy, supra note 36; ABA MODEL JUVNILE DIs-
CIPLINARY POLICY, supra note 36.
114 See ABA Model Adult Disciplinary Policy, supra note 36, § 3.3(a). But see ABA
MODEL JuVENmE DISCIPLINARY PoLcY, supra note 36, § 8.3 (if criminal charge is not pur-
sued, the matter may be treated within the institution as a major breach of prison
discipline).
115 See note 36 & accompanying text supra.
The rationale for permitting ancillary punishment by the prison administration has not
been clearly articulated. The Ohio Department of Corrections has argued that the public
interest in the safe and orderly operation of a penal institution and the prevention of crimi-
nal activity within the penitentiary outweighed any personal inconvenience suffered by the
imprisoned person. In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 93, 296 N.E.2d 280, 289 (1973). Other
courts have upheld similar arguments. See, e.g., People v. Eggelston, 255 Cal. App. 2d 337,
63 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967) (punishment more important for its deterrent effect on other in-
mates); People v. Huntley, 112 Mich. 569, 71 N.W. 178 (1897) (punishment intended for
good government of prison); State v. Weekley, - S.D. - , 240 N.W.2d 80 (1976) (disci-
plinary proceeding meant to serve orderly administration of penitentiary). The Ohio depart-
ment considered the multiple punishment justifiable, since it was levied "pursuant to stan-
dard, long established, unvarying policy." 34 Ohio App. 2d at 93, 296 N.E.2d at 289. Those
arguments failed to persuade the Lamb court-
We find neither reason sufficient to justify judicial tolerance of behavior which
had shocked the conscience of civilized man for almost two thousand years.
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The Role of the Prosecutor
Where departments of correction are unwilling to relinquish
.their right to bring disciplinary action for alleged criminal conduct,
the disciplinary action should only be permitted when the state
has declined to file criminal charges. A prosecutor might permit
the prison disciplinary system to adjudicate the alleged miscon-
duct, but where the state permits the prison disciplinary system to
do so, it must be willing to forego any criminal prosecution. While
this is not the preferred alternative, since it should not be the
function of the prison disciplinary system to adjudicate criminal
guilt or innocence,116 it does serve as a compromise alternative
where the prison administration believes that it must preserve its
power to punish for criminal conduct. However, where the number
of days of good-time at risk are greater than the number of days in
the maximum sentence for the alleged criminal offense, the state
should be restricted to two choices: a criminal action or no action
at all.
CONCLUSION
Where the traditional double jeopardy standards have failed to
protect the imprisoned person from multiple prosecutions and
punishments for the same offense, the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel can serve as an alternative safeguard. The doctrine may be con-
strued to preclude relitigation in a prison disciplinary proceeding
of any issue actually determined in a prior criminal proceeding.
Since the sanctions imposed by the prison disciplinary board are
punitive, the state should also be precluded from relitigating in a
criminal action any issue previously determined by the prison dis-
ciplinary board. The policies of judicial finality, avoidance of du-
We do not doubt that efficient means can be devised to prevent prisoners
from escaping. Tyranny has frequently been efficient. But we recoil from it as
we recoil from the notion of punishing ... a human being . .. twice for a
single offense.
Id. (footnote omitted). While the court did not condone the criminal conduct, it considered
multiple prosecutions and punishments unconstitutional means of preventing it. Id.
It is inefficient for the state to proceed twice against an imprisoned person. Although two
proceedings give the state the "benefits" of two chances to secure an appropriate disposi-
tion, duplicative proceedings waste tax dollars and are not justifiable measures or rehabilita-
tion. The popular conception that the prison disciplinary process functions to rehabilitate
has never been true, although it has been the standard rhetoric for many years. See Bron-
stein, supra note 27, at 31.
"' See notes 112-15 & accompanying text supra.
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plicative proceedings and fundamental fairness outweigh any tech-
nical evidentiary discrepancies arising from the different burdens
of proof imposed on the state in each proceeding.
If the judiciary proves unwilling to broaden the doctrine of col-
laeral estoppel, the problem of multiple prosecutions and punish-
ments can be remedied outside the courthouse. Where the alleged
prison disciplinary offense involves possible criminal acts, the
prison administration should forego any disciplinary action and
turn the case over to the criminal justice system. The imprisoned
person should never be burdened with the prospect of multiple
prosecutions and punishments for the same alleged criminal
conduct.
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